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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Andrew Troy Taylor appeals from the district court's orders relinquishing
jurisdiction and denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In January 2011, a Twin Falls police officer responded to a hotel room to
attempt to serve an arrest warrant on Andrew Taylor.

(PSI, p.1 1.) There, the

officer made contact with Taylor's girlfriend, who informed the officer that Taylor
was not present. (Id.) Because Taylor's girlfriend was on probation, the officer
searched the room.

(Id.)

In the course of the search, the officer recovered

methamphetamine and various drug paraphernalia. (Id.) Taylor was later located
and admitted ownership of the methamphetamine. (Id.)
The state charged Taylor with possession of methamphetamine.

(R.,

pp.50-52.) While he was in pretrial custody on the methamphetamine charge,
Taylor called his girlfriend and directed her to steal another individual's credit
card.

(PSI, pp.21-24.)

The state thereafter additionally charged Taylor with

felony criminal solicitation. (Id.; Idaho Data Repository, Twin Falls Case No. CR2011-02749.)
Pursuant to plea agreement, Taylor pled guilty to possession of
methamphetamine and the state agreed to dismiss the criminal solicitation
charge.

(R., pp.70-81.)

Taylor agreed to waive his right to file an I.C.R. 35

1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"Confidential Exhibits Supreme Court No. 41114-2013."
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motion seeking to reduce his sentence, and his right to appeal "any issues in this
case, including all matters involving the plea or the sentencing and any rulings by
the court, including all suppression issues."

(R., p.81 (emphasis in original).)

The district court imposed a unified seven-year sentence with two years fixed,
and retained jurisdiction for one year. (R., pp.114-121.)
Upon the completion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court
suspended Taylor's sentence and placed him on probation for three years. (R.,
pp.127-131.)

Approximately eight months later, the state filed a report of

probation violation, in which it alleged Taylor failed to submit to multiple drug
tests, failed to complete required treatment, failed to pay required fines and fees,
was charged with driving without privileges, was fired from two jobs, entered an
establishment where alcohol is a primary source of income, violated his curfew,
used marijuana and alcohol, and contacted his girlfriend despite his probation
officer's order not to do so.
probation.

(R., pp.141-166.)

Taylor admitted violating his

(R., pp.188-193.) The district court revoked Taylor's probation, but

retained jurisdiction for a second time. (Id.)
At the conclusion of his second period of retained jurisdiction, the Idaho
Department of Corrections recommended that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction.

(PSI, pp.81-89.) The district court followed this recommendation,

relinquished jurisdiction, and ordered Taylor's sentence be executed.

(R.,

pp.195-199.)
Less than two weeks later, Taylor filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of
sentence. (R., pp.200-201.) Taylor requested that the remainder of his sentence
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be commuted to indeterminate time so that he could immediately be eligible for
parole. (Id.) Taylor also asserted that he was "suffering from depression," and
that "a great deal of his behavior is attributable to his mental state at the time of
his rider."

(Id.)

The district court denied the motion without a hearing.

pp.206-210.) Taylor timely appealed. (R., pp.214-217.)
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(R.,

ISSUES
Taylor states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Mr. Taylor's Rule 35 Motion without a hearing.
(Appellant's brief, p.5)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Taylor waived his right to appeal any issues in this case?

2.

In the alternative, has Taylor failed to show the district court abused its
discretion either by relinquishing jurisdiction or by denying his I.C.R. 35
motion for reduction of sentence?
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In this case, the portion of the written plea agreement pertaining to Taylor's
appellate rights waiver reads as follows:
By accepting this offer the defendant waives the right to (1) file a
Rule 35 Motion (except as to an illegal sentence) and (2) appeal
any issues in this case, including all matters involving the plea or
the sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all
suppression issues. However, the defendant may appeal the
sentence if the Court exceeds the determinate portion of the State's
sentencing recommendation of the "Jail/Prison terms" set forth
above.
(R., p.81 (emphasis in original).)
Taylor's waiver was broad and ambiguous, and was not limited to direct
appeals of his conviction and sentence.
issues in this case.

It instead included appeals of "any"

Taylor has thus waived his statutory right to appeal the

district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his I.C.R. 35 motion.
This Court should therefore dismiss this appeal.
On appeal, Taylor, citing State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 292 P.3d 273
(2013), contends that the scope of his waiver provision does not include appeals
from court orders entered after the entry of the judgment. (Appellant's brief, pp.89.) However, Straub is distinguishable from the present case.
Straub's plea agreement contained the following term, in relevant part:
By accepting this offer the Defendant waives the right to
appeal any issues regarding the conviction, including all matters
involving the plea or sentencing and any rulings made by the court,
including all suppression issues.
Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d 276.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that this waiver did not preclude Straub
from appealing the restitution order entered in his case.
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!sL. at 885-886,

292 P.3d

276-277. Specifically, in analyzing the plea agreement, the Court recognized that
while the phrase "any rulings made by the court" included the court's restitution
order, the term "made" referred only to rulings that the district court made prior to
the plea agreement.

JiL.

No other language in the waiver referenced the

restitution agreement, and therefore, Straub did not waive his right to appeal it.
In the present case, Taylor's plea agreement also includes the phrase,
"any rulings made by the court," which, as in Straub, refers only to rulings that the
district court made prior to the plea agreement. (R., p.S1.) However, Taylor's
plea agreement also separately includes the phrase, "any issues in this case,
including all matters involving the plea or the sentencing." (Id.) Pursuant to this
portion of the agreement, Taylor waived his right to appeal all matters "involving"
his sentencing, including matters concerning the district court's relinquishing of
jurisdiction and the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion.

Further, this portion of the

waiver contains no terminology that limits its scope to court rulings made prior to
the agreement.
Additionally, Taylor contends that even if the waiver would otherwise
preclude his appeal in this case, the state is barred from asserting the existence
of the waiver because the "respondent in an appeal must file a motion to dismiss,

prior to the filling of the appel/ate briefing, if it hopes to obtain dismissal of the
appellant's appeal based on a waiver of appellate rights."
pp.6-S (emphasis in original).)

(Appellant's brief,

In support of his argument, Taylor relies on

Oneida v. Oneida, 95 Idaho 105, 503 P.2d 305 (1972).
Oneida is misplaced.
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Taylor's reliance on

Oneida involved a dispute between shareholders of an Idaho corporation.
95 Idaho at 105, 503 P.2d at 305. "The pleadings were superseded by a written
pre-trial stipulation wherein the parties agreed" to certain issues "to be
determined by the district court."

&

At the beginning of the hearing to determine

one of the issues, the court inquired whether its ruling would be an appealable
order or whether the parties would "stipulate" to "move into the next part of the

& at 106, 503 P.2d at 306. Both parties indicated their willingness to

case."

stipulate it was not an appealable order.

&

Despite the stipulation, one party

filed a notice of appeal after the court resolved the first issue against it.

& The

respondents on appeal argued "the appellant waived their right to appeal the
district court's order."

& In response to this argument, the Idaho Supreme Court

stated:
As the appellants correctly point out, however, an objection based
upon such a stipulation should be raised by a motion to dismiss the
appeal. Southern Indiana Power Co. v. Cook, 182 Ind. 505, 107
N.E. 12 (1914); Speeth v. Fields, 71 N.E.2d 149 (Ohio App. 1946)
(per curiam); 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error s 240 (1962); see
Phelps v. Blome, 150 Neb. 547, 35 N.W.2d 93 (1948); cf 4
Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error s 241 (1962). Raising such an
objection at the earliest stage of appellate proceedings may spare
the appellant further useless expenditures (for, e.g., an appeal
bond, transcripts and additional attorneys' fees). Having failed to
move to dismiss the appeal, the respondents are in no position to
rely in their appellate brief, upon the alleged waiver of the right to
appeal.
Onedia, 95 Idaho at 106-107, 503 P.2d at 306-307 (footnote omitted).
There are at least two significant differences between Oneida and the
present case. First, Oneida involved a stipulation that the parties would proceed
to "move into the next part of the case" rather than pursue an interlocutory appeal
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of the court's first determination and, therefore, did not involve an appeal waiver.
The second, but related, difference is that Oneida involved an appeal from an
intermediate decision by the district court. Unlike Oneida, the waiver at issue in
the present case involves a plea agreement relating to the disposition of the
entire case and an appeal from a final judgment. Nothing in Oneida forecloses
the state's ability to seek dismissal of an appeal short of a pre-briefing motion to
dismiss where, as here, a final judgment has been entered. Moreover, Oneida
does not, as Taylor claims, include a pre-briefing motion requirement at al1. 2 In
Oneida, the Idaho Supreme Court merely recognized that "an objection based
upon ... a stipulation [not to appeal] should be raised by a motion to dismiss the
appeaL" 95 Idaho at 107, 503 P.2d at 307. The Court then noted that "[r]aising
such an objection at the earliest stage of appellate proceedings may spare the
appellant further useless expenditures" such as "an appeal bond, transcripts, and
additional attorneys' fees."

kL.

While the identified expenditures would typically

be incurred prior to briefing, the Court does not define what "the earliest stage of
appellate proceedings" is and the Court even acknowledges that filing a motion
to dismiss will not "always spare the appellant" costs associated with an appeal
since "[a]n appellate court may deny such a motion but nevertheless dismiss the

Taylor characterizes this alleged requirement as a holding. (Appellant's Brief,
p.6 ("The Idaho Supreme Court held that the respondent in an appeal must file a
motion to dismiss, prior to the filing of the appel/ate briefing, if it hopes to obtain
dismissal of the appellant's appeal based on a waiver of appellate rights[.]")
(italics original, bold added).) The Court, however, ultimately dismissed the
appeal in Oneida because it was from an unappealable intermediate decision.
Thus, the Court's discussion of the respondent's obligation to file a motion to
dismiss the appeal was ultimately dicta since it was not "necessary to the
decision." State v. Hawkins, 2013 WL 1632100 *4 (2013).
2
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appeal after briefing and argument." Onedia, 95 Idaho at 107 n.2, 503 P.2d at
307 n.2. Indeed, it is unclear how an appellate court could adequately consider a
motion to dismiss without the preparation of transcripts and portions of the record
that would be relevant to the question of waiver.
Beyond the factual and procedural differences between this case and
Oneida, the law regarding appellate waivers that has developed since Oneida is
inconsistent with Taylor's claim that the state is barred from seeking dismissal at
this juncture.

To the extent this Court considers Oneida at all relevant to the

analysis, it should be disavowed.
The Idaho Supreme Court "will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior
opinions unless it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the
case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust." State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho
511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted).

Oneida provides no

compelling reason to require the state to seek dismissal of an appeal in a
criminal case at some undetermined time characterized as "the earliest stage of
appellate proceedings." The only justification apparent from the opinion is that
requiring as much "may spare the appellant further useless expenditures."
Oneida, 95 Idaho at 107, 503 P.2d at 307.

As previously noted, however, a

motion to dismiss will not necessarily accomplish this goal because of the need
to have an adequate record to consider the waiver issue.
More importantly, it will not always be clear from the outset that an appeal
would be subject to dismissal as a result of a waiver.

In most cases, the

appellate court must assess the scope and applicability of the waiver first before
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determining whether a case should be dismissed or whether the issues raised
should be considered on the merits.
Further, whatever cost savings a particular defendant might enjoy if the
state filed a motion to dismiss at "the earliest stage of appellate proceedings" is
also not particularly persuasive given that it is the defendant's choice to incur
those costs knowing that he has waived his right to appeal.
Additionally, both the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals
have, in numerous cases post-Oneida, considered, after briefing, whether a
criminal defendant waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement.
Straub, 153 Idaho at 885-886, 292 P.3d at 276-277; Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 496,
129 P.3d 1241, 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720; State v.
Hansen, 2012 WL6634131 *2 (Ct. App. Dec. 19,2012); State v. Rodriguez, 142
Idaho 786, 133 P.3d 1251 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 270,
141 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Ct. App. 2006); Holdaway, 130 Idaho at 484,943 P.2d at
74.
"It is not just the prosecutor who is bound by a plea agreement.

A

defendant also is obligated to adhere to its terms, and the State is entitled to
receive the benefit of its bargain." Holdaway, 130 Idaho at 484,943 P.2d at 74.
Although the state has already been deprived of part of the benefit of its bargain
by having to respond to Taylor's appeal at all, it should not be further deprived of
the benefit of its bargain by having this Court consider the merits of Taylor's claim
simply because resources have already been expended in relation to this appeal.
This Court should reject Taylor's argument and dismiss this appeal.
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II.
In The Alternative, Has Taylor Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion Either By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Or By Denying His I.C.R. 35
Motion For Reduction Of Sentence

A.

Introduction
As discussed above, Taylor contends that the district court abused its

discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and by denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for
reduction of sentence. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) Even if Taylor had not
waived his right to appeal any issue in this case, he has failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion in making its sentencing determinations.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In
Relinquishing Jurisdiction
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse
of that discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981);
State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A
court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of
discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984).
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After reviewing the report and recommendation from the Department of
Corrections, as well as other files and records associated with Taylor's case, the
district court elected to relinquish jurisdiction following Taylor's second rider. (R.,
pp.195-199.) The record supports the district court's discretionary decision.
After performing relatively well on his first rider and earning a positive
recommendation

from

the

Department of Corrections,

the

district

court

suspended Taylor's sentence and placed him on probation. (PSI, pp.76-80; R.,
pp.127-133.) Approximately eight months later, the state filed a motion to revoke
probation, in which it alleged a bevy of probation violations.

(R., pp.141-166.)

Taylor ultimately admitted to violating his probation by failing to attend a required
treatment program, failing to make monthly payments towards court costs and
fines, violating the curfew imposed by his probation officer, being fired from two
places of employment, entering an establishment where alcohol is a primary
source of income, and for using marijuana. (R., pp.141-150, 187-193.)
Rather than revoke his probation and impose his sentence, the district
court gave Taylor the opportunity to participate in a second rider.

(R., pp.188-

193.) There, Taylor regressed and performed worse than he did on his first rider.
The addendum to Taylor's PSI prepared by the Department of Corrections
summarized, in part:
I believe at this time that Mr. Taylor would struggle on
probation. He continues to be verbally aggressive and believes
that IDOC is out to get him. He feels as though he has been a
"victim in a corrupt system." He does not feel as though he should
have been given a "Rider" and does not believe he should have to
do the things that are asked of him.
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When he is not happy with an answer he will argue,
complain, threaten to sue, shake his head, cry and manipulate until
he either gets in trouble or gets what he wants. He has received
multiple DOR's because will not adhere to what authority tells him
to do. Mr. Taylor has shown an unwillingness to problem solve in a
prosocial manner and is constantly taking the victim-stance when
things do not go his way. He has stated many times that he has a
girlfriend and a baby on the way and I feel that with Mr. Taylor's
volatile behavior it would be unsafe to place him in a home with a
small child.

I feel at this time we have given Mr. Taylor every opportunity
to want to do this program but he has spent more time fighting
against it then he has identifying his own problems and working on
them. He appears to be more concerned about his life being fair
than he is about change.
(PSI, pp.88-89.)

The incidents forming the basis for this summary are

documented in the remainder of the report and attached C-Notes. (PSI, pp.81106.)
Taylor's extensive criminal record further validates the district court's
decision not to give Taylor further opportunities on community supervision. While
the present case constitutes Taylor's first felony conviction, Taylor's PSI
references prior misdemeanor convictions for battery, domestic battery, violation
of a protection order, possession of drug paraphernalia, petty theft, malicious
injury to property, and driving without privileges.

(PSI, pp.3-6.) Further, at the

time of the preparation of his PSI, Taylor had an active warrant for a pending
charge in South Carolina for sexual conduct with a minor. (PSI, p.7.)
The district court considered the relevant information and reasonably
determined that Taylor was not an appropriate candidate for community
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supervision. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide
Taylor yet another opportunity for probation, or to reward him with a reduced
sentence. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Taylor has failed to establish
that the district court abused its discretion.

D.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Denying
Taylor's I.C.R. 35 Motion
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).

To prevail on appeal, Taylor must "show that the

sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

!sL

Whether a hearing should be given on a Rule 35 Motion is a matter for the
discretion of the court. State v. Peterson, 126 Idaho 522, 525, 887 P.2d 67, 70
(Ct. App. 1994). Where a defendant does not identify what evidence he might
have produced at a Rule 35 hearing that he was unable to produce through
affidavits, the district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a
hearing on the motion. State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830,839 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App.
1992).
In this case, less than two weeks after the district court relinquished
jurisdiction following his second rider, Taylor filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for
reduction of sentence.

(R., p.200.)

Specifically, Taylor noted that he was

expecting a child he wished to support, and requested that "his remaining
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sentence be commuted to indeterminate time so that he may immediately go
before the Parole Board."

(Id.) The motion was "based on the fact that

Defendant is suffering from depression and believes a great deal of his behavior
is attributable to his mental state at the time of his rider." (Id.) Taylor did not
reveal any new diagnosis or other circumstances to provide context or support
for his assertion that he was suffering from depression.

Nor did the motion

specifically identify what type of evidence Taylor planned to present at any
hearing.
The district court denied the motion without a hearing. (R., pp.206-21 0.)
After citing the applicable legal standards, the court correctly recognized that
Taylor failed to provide any evidence that was not previously considered by the
court. (Id.)
Taylor's mental health issues were documented in previously-submitted
sentencing materials relied on by the district court to make prior sentencing
determinations.

Taylor told his presentence investigator that he tried to hang

himself with a sock while he was in jail. (PSI, p.10.)

Taylor also stated that he

was assessed by a doctor at the jail, and that he felt "he would benefit from
mental health counseling to address his childhood."

(Id.)

According to a

sUbstance abuse evaluation conducted in conjunction with his underlying
sentencing, Taylor "scored in the moderate range of the Internal Mental Distress
Scale," and that his self-reported symptoms, which included suicidal thoughts,
indicated "the possible existence of a stress disorder."

(PSI, p.46.)

The

evaluation also noted that Taylor reported that he not been diagnosed with or
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received treatment for any mental, emotional, or psychological problem.
p.47.)

(PSI,

The C-Notes associated with Taylor's second rider referenced Taylor's

expressed feelings of depression and thoughts of self-harm. (PSI, p.90.) Finally,
the fact that Taylor was expecting a child had also already been referenced in the
Idaho Department of Corrections' report. (PSI, p.89.) All of this information was
available for the court's consideration at the time it chose to relinquish
jurisdiction, and prior to Taylor's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
In light of his failures on probation and in the retained jurisdiction program,
Taylor cannot show that the district court abused its discretion in declining to
reward him with another opportunity on probation, or with a reduced sentence. In
light of his failure to support his I.C.R. 35 motion with new evidence or
information regarding any asserted "depression," Taylor also failed to show that
the district court abused its discretion either by denying the motion, or by
declining Taylor's request for a hearing. This Court should therefore affirm the
district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying Taylor's I.C.R. motion
for reduction of sentence.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders relinquishing jurisdiction over Taylor and denying Taylor's I.C.R. 35 motion
for reduction of sentence.
DATED this 10th day of April, 2014.
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MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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